Active labour market policy in East Germany: waiting for the economy to take off by Lechner, Michael & Wunsch, Conny
www.ssoar.info
Active labour market policy in East Germany:
waiting for the economy to take off
Lechner, Michael; Wunsch, Conny
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Lechner, M., & Wunsch, C. (2006). Active labour market policy in East Germany: waiting for the economy to
take off. (IAB Discussion Paper: Beiträge zum wissenschaftlichen Dialog aus dem Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und
Berufsforschung, 20/2006). Bonn: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (IAB).
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-315930
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
No. 20/2006
Active Labour Market Policy 
in East Germany
Waiting for the Economy to take off
Michael Lechner, Conny Wunsch
Beiträge zum wissenschaftlichen Dialog aus dem Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit
IABDiscussionPaper No. 20/2006  2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Active Labour Market Policy  
in East Germany 
Waiting for the Economy to take off 
Michael Lechner, Conny Wunsch* 
* Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research (SIAW),  
University of St. Gallen, Bodanstr. 8, CH-9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland 
Michael.lechner@unisg.ch 
conny.wunsch@unisg.ch 
www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auch mit seiner neuen Reihe „IAB-Discussion Paper“ will das Forschungsinstitut der Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit den Dialog mit der externen Wissenschaft intensivieren. Durch die rasche Verbreitung von 
Forschungsergebnissen über das Internet soll noch vor Drucklegung Kritik angeregt und Qualität  
gesichert werden. 
 
 
 
Also with its new series "IAB Discussion Paper" the research institute of the German Federal  
Employment Agency wants to intensify dialogue with external science. By the rapid spreading  
of research results via Internet still before printing criticism shall be stimulated and quality shall  
be ensured. 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 20/2006   
 
 
3
Contents 
Abstract ......................................................................................... 4 
1 Introduction............................................................................... 5 
2 Economic conditions and labour market policy in East Germany .......10 
2.1 Economic development since German Unification ...........................10 
2.2 Unemployment insurance in Germany 1998-2004 ..........................10 
2.3 East German ALMP 1998-2005 ....................................................11 
2.4 Interactions between programme participation and UI payments......14 
3 Data and definition of the evaluation sample .................................15 
3.1 The data ..................................................................................15 
3.2 Definition of our evaluation sample and programme participation .....16 
3.3 Selected descriptive statistics......................................................18 
3.4 Measurement of the labour market outcomes ................................21 
4 Identification and estimation .......................................................22 
4.1 Conditional independence ...........................................................22 
4.2 Estimation ................................................................................24 
5 The effects of programme participation.........................................25 
5.1 Programmes increase unemployment of their participants ...............26 
5.2 Programmes keep participants busy and increase benefit receipt......27 
5.3 Programmes do not increase the employment chances of their 
participants ..............................................................................30 
5.4 Several groups of participants would have been better off had they 
participated in a different programme...........................................31 
5.5 Unemployed with reasonable chances on the labour market got hurt 
most........................................................................................32 
5.6 Why were the previous results more positive? ...............................34 
6 Sensitivity checks ......................................................................35 
7 Conclusions ..............................................................................36 
Appendix A: Data.........................................................................42 
Appendix B: Technical details of the matching estimator used ............43 
Appendix C: Additional results .......................................................44 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 20/2006   
 
 
4
Abstract 
We investigate the effects of the most important East German active la-
bour market programmes on the labour market outcomes of their partici-
pants. The analysis is based on a large and informative individual data-
base coming from administrative data sources. Using matching methods, 
we find that over a horizon of 2.5 years after programme start the pro-
grammes fail to increase the employment chances of their participants in 
the regular labour market. However, the programmes may have other ef-
fects for their participants that may be considered important in the espe-
cially difficult situation experienced in the East German labour market. 
 
Keywords: Matching estimation, causal effects, programme evaluation, 
panel data 
JEL classification: J 68 
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1 Introduction* 
Over the last decade, Germany spent more than 7 billion EUR per year on 
active labour market policies (ALMP) to combat the large and persistent 
unemployment problem in East Germany. In this paper, we investigate 
the effects of the most important parts of these policies on the labour 
market outcomes of their participants. The analysis is based on a large 
and informative individual database coming from administrative data 
sources and employs econometric matching methods. Concentrating on 
programmes that start between 2000 and 2002, we find that over a hori-
zon of 2.5 years the programmes fail to increase the employment chances 
of their participants in the regular labour market. However, the pro-
grammes may have other effects, like keeping their participants occupied, 
that may, or may not, be worthwhile having in the special situation of the 
East German economy. 
Although German Unification happened not too long ago, there is already 
a considerable literature about the effects of training and subsidised non-
market jobs in East Germany, with mixed evidence though. Over time, the 
data quality of the studies increased considerably. The earlier studies for 
East Germany use survey data. These data are rather limited with respect 
to the length of the observation period, sample size and the availability of 
sufficiently detailed information to account for selectivity and programme 
heterogeneity.1 Most of these studies find negative or insignificant short- 
to medium-term employment effects (e.g. Pannenberg, 1995; Hübler, 
1998; Hujer and Wellner, 2000; Kraus, Puhani and Steiner, 2000), but 
there are also studies that obtain positive effects for some programmes 
                                                          
* The first author has further affiliations with ZEW, Mannheim, CEPR, London, IZA, 
Bonn, and PSI, London. Financial support from the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung (IAB), Nuremberg, (project 6-531.1a) is gratefully acknowledged. In 
the early stages of this project, we collaborated with Bernd Fitzenberger and his team 
at the Goethe-University of Frankfurt to construct the database. We are grateful to 
Stefan Bender (IAB) for his continuing support to improve the quality of the data. The 
interested reader will find additional background material for this paper in an internet 
appendix on our website www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner/lw_fbw_ost. 
1  Pannenberg (1995), Steiner and Kraus (1995), Pannenberg and Helberger (1997), 
Fitzenberger and Prey (1998, 2000), Hübler (1997, 1998), Staat (1997), Kraus, Puha-
ni and Steiner (1999, 2000), Lechner (1999, 2000), Prey (1999), Hujer and Wellner 
(2000), Eichler and Lechner (2002), Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2004), 
Bergemann (2005). These studies use the German Socioeconomic Panel or the Labour 
Market Monitor East or for Saxony-Anhalt (see the survey by Wunsch, 2005).  
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(e.g. Pannenberg and Helberger, 1997; Prey, 1999, Eichler and Lechner, 
2002). The lack of robustness is due to the sensitivity of the results to dif-
ferent parametric assumptions, small sample sizes, and the inability to 
measure medium or even long-run effects, as well as problems in appro-
priately defining programme and outcome variables. 
The next group of papers use new administrative data explicitly developed 
for the evaluation of training programmes. As for the previous studies, 
these programmes started in the early years after unification. Speckesser 
(2004) and Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) analyse one special type 
of government-sponsored training programme. Based on propensity score 
matching, they find negative lock-in effects up to 12-18 months after pro-
gramme start. Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) obtain positive em-
ployment effects of 5 to 10 percentage points about 20 months after pro-
gramme start. Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005b) use matching meth-
ods to assess the effectiveness of three types of training programmes 
conducted 1993-1994 and follow outcomes over eight years after pro-
gramme start. Besides the typical lock-in effects, they find strong positive 
medium- to long-run employment effects at a magnitude of 10-15 per-
centage points for short training courses and for women for the longer 
training programmes.    
However, the problem with that specific data set is not only the limited 
sample size, the lack of detailed information on the specific type of train-
ing programme, and the lack of information on other programmes, but 
also the measures for the short- to medium-run labour market outcomes. 
The data do not allow distinguishing between unsubsidised employment in 
the regular labour market and subsidised employment, such as non-
market jobs in employment programmes, which is in fact part of the ac-
tive labour market policy.  
The third generation of data used to evaluate active labour market policies 
in East Germany comes from the so-called 'integrated employment histo-
ries (IEH)' data base of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). 
These data are used in this paper as well. Compared to the previous ad-
ministrative data available for East Germany, the IEH covers a larger 
sample, contains much more detailed programme and outcome informa-
tion, and improves substantially the information about the selection proc-
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ess. Due to the latter, all papers using this data so far are based on a se-
lection on observables strategy to identify the causal effects of the pro-
grammes. Almost all employ some sort of semiparametric matching esti-
mator. The general disadvantage of this database, which covers pro-
grammes and outcomes from 2000 to mid 2005 in its most recent version, 
is that only short to medium-term outcomes are available. This limited 
time horizon is the price to pay when interest is in recent programmes. 
For example, in our study, which is based on matching estimation as well, 
we consider programme participation between 2000 and 2002. Thus, we 
observe outcomes for all participants only up to 2.5 years.2 However, as 
shown by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005a, 2005b), after 30 months 
we can already get a reasonably accurate idea about the magnitude of 
possible long-term effects, at least for the shorter programmes. All papers 
analysing recent programmes have (and have to have) a similarly short or 
even shorter time horizon.  
There are two groups of papers based on this database so far, depending 
whether they evaluate training programmes or employment programmes. 
Concerning the training programmes, Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2006) 
analyse the effects of programmes conducted in the period 2000-2002 on 
the transition rate into regular employment. Methodologically, this paper 
is an exception, because it is not based on matching estimation. Instead, 
the authors estimate a multivariate mixed proportional hazard rate model. 
Because of the short time horizon available to observe outcomes in their 
study, the negative lock-in effects drive their results. Based on similar 
data, Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Waller (2006) analyse the ef-
fects of three broad groups of training programmes for participants in 
2000 until 2001 using matching methods. The authors conclude that 
about 20 months after the start of the programmes, there are no or only 
very small effects that are hard to pin down precisely.3 
                                                          
2  Going beyond that time horizon would imply dropping late starts. Thus, the differences 
after 2.5 years compared to the earlier results would reflect differences in the compo-
sition of participants, content of the programmes as well as effects that need longer 
time to materialise. Since such a composite effect is difficult to interpret as a policy 
parameter, we refrain from presenting these numbers.  
3  There is also the report for the government about the recent labour market reform in 
2004 as suggested by the so-called Hartz-Kommission (see Schneider, Brenke, Kaiser, 
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Using a different version of the IEH, several papers by Caliendo, Hujer, 
and Thomson (2004, 2005a, 2005b) analyse the effects of employment 
programmes by comparing participants in February 2000 with eligible 
nonparticipants in the same month. Based on matching methods, they 
conclude that after 3 years the programmes did not improve the employ-
ment chances of their participants. 
Our paper contributes in several dimensions to a better understanding of 
the individual effects of East German labour market programmes. First, 
this is the first study looking jointly at the effects of a large variety of 
training programmes as well as two employment programmes, allowing 
interesting comparisons across programme types. We do not only com-
pare the programmes to some nonparticipation state, but also compare 
them with each other. The latter comparison gives interesting hints about 
the effectiveness of the caseworkers' allocation of different participants 
into different programmes. Second, we find interesting differences of the 
effects of the programmes with respect to individual heterogeneity of their 
participants: For example, their effects are much worse for individuals 
who have good pre-programme labour market prospects. Third, compared 
to the studies looking at post-unification training programmes, we have 
much larger samples, better information on the type of programmes, on 
individual labour market outcomes, as well as on the selection process 
into the programmes. Thus, we obtain considerably more comprehensive 
and more robust results as before. Finally, the paper contains new inter-
esting findings that appear to be of policy relevance. Those results can be 
summarised as follows:  
Programme participation leads to increased unemployment, more pro-
gramme participation, and increased benefit receipt.  
With respect to the chances in the regular labour market, some pro-
grammes actually harm participants, while other programmes did at least 
not increase the chances of their participants. There is so far no sign that 
there will be any positive long-term effects. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Steinwede, Jesske, Uhlendorff, 2006) which contains some hints about possible effects 
of training in East Germany. Those hints clearly provide no robust evidence for posi-
tive effects. 
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The selection process into the different programme types was not optimal, 
because a different allocation of participants among the programmes 
would have improved employment. Furthermore, too many people with 
intact labour market chances end up in programmes. Those people fared 
worst among all participants. 
From the analysis, it appears clear that in the very depressed labour mar-
ket of East Germany, the recent active labour market policy did not help in 
reintegrating the unemployed back into the unsubsidised part of the la-
bour market. If one pursues the view that active labour market policies 
are supposed to cure some malfunctioning of the labour market, than one 
is led to conclude that with such amount of malfunctioning as seen in East 
Germany, this cure is not strong enough. It appears instead that other 
more substantial changes may be required that attack the roots of the 
problems, and not only its symptoms. However, these findings do not 
necessarily imply that the programmes had no positive effects on their 
participants, it just implies that those effects are probably in a different 
sphere (receiving earnings from work instead of benefits, having a daily 
routine, etc.) than earnings and employment in the regular labour market. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The next section 
briefly reviews the economic and institutional environment of the East 
German labour market. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines 
our approach to identification and estimation of the programme effects. 
Section 5 contains the results from the econometric matching estimations. 
Section 6 discusses some of the sensitivity and heterogeneity checks con-
ducted. The last section draws policy conclusions. Appendix A gives more 
information on the data used. Appendix B contains some more details on 
the econometrics applied, while Appendix C contains additional results not 
presented in the main body of the text. Finally, an appendix that is avail-
able in the internet contains more detailed background material concern-
ing estimation, data, and results. 
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2 Economic conditions and labour market policy 
in East Germany 
2.1 Economic development since German Unification 
After the near-collapse of the East German economy following German 
Unification (by December 1990, production of goods had dropped to 46% 
of its 1989 level; Akerlof et al., 1991), the East German work force had 
declined by almost 3 million people in 1991 (BA, 2001). A substantial part 
of these people was directly absorbed by active labour market pro-
grammes to the effect that the official unemployment rate - which does 
not include participants in ALMP – is not skyrocketing. Furthermore, many 
older people left the labour force encouraged by generous early retirement 
schemes. In spite of this, registered unemployment rose rapidly to a rate 
of more than 10 per cent in 1991 (BA, 1992). Since then, the East Ger-
man economy has been recovering only slowly. Unemployment has risen 
steadily and has become very persistent with a fraction of long-term un-
employed of 40% in 2005. The fraction of young people and persons with 
low education or health problems has also increased steadily while female 
unemployment is declining, because more women leave the labour force. 
Table1:  GDP growth and unemployment since 1993 
 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
GDP growth 12.6 6.3 1.9 2.8 1.1 1.0 -0.1 
Unemployment rate 15 15 19 19 19 20 19 
Thereof:        
Women 65 64 58 54 51 49 47 
Non German 3 4 4 4 5 5 6 
No professional degree 23 21 21 24 24 23 26 
Age < 25 12 11 12 12 13 12 14 
Age ≥ 55 8 16 20 21 15 10 12 
Unemployed for more than 1 year 31 29 30 32 35 43 40 
Health problems 10 14 16 19 21 21 24 
Note: Entries are in percent.  
Sources: Statistische Ämter der Länder (2006), BA (1992-2006). 
 
2.2 Unemployment insurance in Germany 1998-2004 
In Germany, unemployment insurance (UI) is compulsory for all employ-
ees with more than a minor employment including apprentices in voca-
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tional training.4 German UI does not cover self-employed. Persons who 
have contributed to the UI for at least 12 months within the three years 
preceding an unemployment spell are eligible for unemployment benefits 
(UB). The minimum UB entitlement is six months. In the period we con-
sider, the maximum claim increases stepwise with the total duration of the 
contributions in the seven years before becoming unemployed, and age, 
up to a maximum of 32 months at age 54 or above with previous contri-
butions of at least 64 months.5 Actual payment of UB for eligible unem-
ployed is conditional on active job search, regular show-up at the public 
employment service (PES), and participation in ALMP measures. Since 
1994, the replacement rate is 67% of previous average net earnings from 
insured employment with dependent children, and 60% without.  
Until 2005, unemployed became eligible for unemployment assistance 
(UA) after exhaustion of UB. In contrast to UB, UA was means tested and 
potentially indefinite. However, like UB, UA was proportional to previous 
earnings but with lower replacement rates than UB (57% / 53% with / 
without dependent children, respectively). Unemployed who were ineligi-
ble for UB and UA could receive social assistance, which was a fixed 
monthly payment unrelated to previous earnings, means tested and ad-
ministered by local authorities. 
2.3 East German ALMP 1998-2005 
Directly after unification, short-time work, which is a reduction in work 
hours combined with a subsidy from the unemployment insurance system 
to compensate the resulting earnings loss, subsidised non-market jobs 
(so-called job creation schemes, JCS), and further vocational training 
(FVT) was used on a rather massive scale. In recent years, however, the 
focus shifted towards the internationally more common minor adjustments 
of skills in short so-called training measures (which are much cheaper 
than FVT). Furthermore, direct temporary wage subsidies as well as the 
                                                          
4  However, civil servants (Beamte), judges, professional soldiers, clergymen and some 
other groups of persons are exempted from contributions. For further details on the 
German UI and ALMP, see the comprehensive survey by Wunsch (2005). 
5  For example, a 40-year-old unemployed with at least two years of insured employ-
ment has a maximum claim of 12 months. 
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support of self-employment increased at the expense of subsidised non-
market jobs (see Table 2). 
Table 2: The most important instruments of ALMP in East Germany (1998-2005) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 Expenditure in million EUR 
Total expenditure on ALMP  7920 8964 8620 8360 8265 7326 5042 2454 
 Share in % 
Training measures (TM) 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 2 
Further vocational training (FVT) 37 33 34 36 35 27 25 16 
Short-time work 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 
Job creation schemes (JCS) 35 32 31 25 22 18 19 7 
Structural adjustment measures 
(SAM) 
18 17 14 9 8 7 7 6 
Temporary wage subsidies 2 3 5 7 10 12 12 8 
Support of self-employment 2 2 3 3 3 6 14 36 
Other 4 10 11 17 19 26 17 21 
 Participation in 1000 
Training measures (TM)a NA 167 191 227 332 376 400 287 
Further vocational training (FVT)a 236 183 214 188 183 92 61 40 
Short-time workb 34 27 24 27 45 35 29 25 
Job creation schemes (JCS)b 151 168 153 123 92 70 65 36 
Structural adjustment measures 
(SAM)b 
162 180 98 67 58 40 28 12 
Temporary wage subsidiesb NA 65 91 99 116 107 90 29 
Support of self-employmentb NA 32 30 31 34 72 68 105 
Note: NA: Not available. a Entries in 1000 persons. b Yearly average of stock in 1000 persons.  
Source: BA (1992-2006). 
 
One important feature of German ALMP is the large heterogeneity of train-
ing courses. Course contents, the amount of human capital added and 
planned durations vary considerably, particularly among FVT courses. 
With our data (see Section 3), we are able to account for heterogeneity in 
training measures and FVT in a detailed way.  
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Table 3: Descriptions of the programmes we evaluate 
Programme type (acronym) Description Mean planned  
duration (days) 
Short combined measures 
(SCM) 
Acquisition of specific knowledge and skills  56 
Jobseeker assessment 
(JSA) 
Assessment of jobseekers ability and willingness to 
search for job and to work, basic job search assis-
tance 
 45 
Short training (ST) Minor adjustment of skills  48 
Job related training (JRT) Combined off-the-job and on-the-job training in a 
specific field of profession 
 172 
General further training  
 ≤ 9 months GT-9M) 
General update, adjustment and extension of 
knowledge and skills; mainly off the job, planned 
duration ≤ 9 months 
 173 
General further training 
 > 9 months (GT-9M+) 
General update, adjustment and extension of 
knowledge and skills; mainly off the job, planned 
duration > 9 months 
 347 
Degree course (DC) Vocational training that awards a formal profes-
sional degree and that corresponds to regular vo-
cational training in the German apprenticeship sys-
tem 
 658 
Job creation scheme (JCS) Subsidised non-market jobs which are in the inter-
est of the public 
 274 
Structural adjustment meas-
ure (SAM) 
Subsidised non-market jobs in economically weak 
regions 
 315 
Note: Calculations of the mean planned durations are based on our evaluation sample (see Section 
3.3). 
Table 3 summarises the programme types we evaluate in our empirical 
analyses. Besides seven types of training courses, we evaluate the most 
important forms of subsidised non-market jobs. We do not include tempo-
rary wage subsidies and support of self-employment though, because our 
identification strategy (see Section 4) might not be valid for these pro-
grammes. Short-time work is not observable in our data. 
Short combined measures (SCM) are a series of very short training 
courses aiming at removing specific minor skill deficits. Jobseeker assess-
ment (JSA) courses have the main objective of assessing a jobseeker's 
availability, willingness, and ability for active job search or specific kinds 
of jobs or programmes, but they also provide basic job search assistance. 
Short training (ST) courses provide minor adjustments of skills. All three 
types of programmes belong to the category of so-called training meas-
ures (TM) and have durations of no more than three months with mean 
planned durations of below two months.  
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Job related training (JRT) combines off-the-job training with a substantial 
amount of on-the-job training in a specific field of profession, where the 
latter often takes place in a simulated work environment rather than a 
regular firm. The mean planned duration is about six months. General 
training (GT) subsumes the classical, mainly off the job, further vocational 
training courses which provide a general update, adjustment, and exten-
sion of knowledge and skills. Planned durations range from only a few 
months to up to two years. Degree courses (DC) provide a usually two-
year training which is equivalent to an apprenticeship in the German ap-
prenticeship system. It awards an officially recognised professional degree 
if completed successfully. JRT, GT, and DC belong to the category of fur-
ther vocational training (FVT). 
Job creation schemes (JCS) and structural adjustment measures (SAM) 
are subsidised jobs, which are outside of and should not compete with the 
regular labour market. JCS are targeted at unemployed with particularly 
bad employment prospects like the elderly or the long-term unemployed. 
SAM aim at smoothing the effects of large job losses in a region by ab-
sorbing the unemployed in subsidised employment. In both programmes, 
participants hold these jobs usually for about one year. 
2.4 Interactions between programme participation and 
UI payments 
One important feature of German labour market policy has always been 
that (most) programme participations extend the period in which unem-
ployment benefits (UB) can potentially be drawn. The extension occurs 
either directly by explicitly counting programme participation in the same 
way as insured employment towards the acquisition of UB claims. Or it 
occurs indirectly by receiving a different form of benefit (so-called mainte-
nance allowance, MA, during participation in FVT) of the same amount as 
UB (or UA) during participation without or only less than proportionately 
reducing the UB claim at programme start. Table 4 summarises the re-
spective rules. 
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Table 4: Programme participation and accumulation of benefits  
Year Programme Rules 
FVT Receipt of MA if eligible; UB claim stays constant; counts in the 
same way as insured employment 
Until 
1997 
JCS Regular salary, no benefits; counts as insured employment 
TM Receipt of UB or UA if eligible; UB claim reduced by the programme 
duration 
FVT Receipt of MA if eligible; UB claim stays constant; entitlement qualifi-
cation period extended by up to 2 years 
1998-
2002 
JCS, SAM Regular salary, no benefits; counts as insured employment 
TM Receipt of UB or UA if eligible; UB claim reduced by the programme 
duration 
FVT Receipt of MA if eligible; UB claim reduced by half of the programme 
duration; entitlement qualification period extended by up to 2 years 
2003-
2004 
JCS, SAM Regular salary, no benefits; no longer counts as insured employment 
TM Receipt of UB or UA if eligible; UB claim reduced by the programme 
duration 
FVT Receipt of UB or UA  if eligible; UB claim reduced by half of the pro-
gramme duration 
Since 
2005 
JCS, SAM Regular salary, no benefits; does not count as insured employment 
Note: TM and SAM have been introduced in 1998. The regular entitlement qualification period are 
the three years before the beginning of an unemployment spell in which the duration of in-
sured employment is counted for the acquisition of an UB claim. At least 12 months of insured 
employment within this period are needed to acquire a new UB claim and the total claim in-
creases with the duration of insured employment in the seven years before the beginning of 
an unemployment spell. 
Since 1998, all major reforms of German labour market policy have re-
duced the possibilities to renew or extent UB claims by programme par-
ticipation as legislators have increasingly become aware of the adverse 
effects these rules have on search intensity and the budget of the public 
employment agency (PES).  
3 Data and definition of the evaluation sample 
3.1 The data 
We use a new administrative database that has been built up by the Insti-
tute for Employment Research (IAB). The database is a 2% random sam-
ple from all individuals who have been subject to German social insurance 
at least once since 1990. It combines information from four different ad-
ministrative sources: social insurance records, programme participation 
data as well as the benefit payment register and the jobseeker register of 
the PES. Table A.1 in Appendix A summarises the main features of these 
data sources. 
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Besides being very recent, the database is very rich in terms of covariate 
information and observed pre-programme employment histories (at least 
10 years) to control for selectivity in programme participation (see Section 
4.1). Moreover, it covers participation in all major German active labour 
market programmes for the unemployed from 2000 to mid 2005, and the 
information about programmes is very detailed so that it is possible to ac-
count for programme heterogeneity in a uniquely detailed way. 
Nevertheless, the database also has several drawbacks that may be im-
portant for the interpretation of our results. Firstly, information on direct 
programme costs is not available in the data. It is therefore not possible 
to consider the actual net effects of programmes. Secondly, prior to 2000 
there is no explicit information on participation in ALMP except for benefit 
payment during participation in training. In particular, it is not possible to 
distinguish subsidised from non-subsidised employment. Thirdly, the 
common observation period after programme start is relatively short (only 
2.5 years) since we are interested in relatively recent programmes con-
ducted 2000-2002. Because of the rather long durations of some pro-
grammes (see Table 1), Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005a, b) show 
that the ability to measure long-run effects is crucial for the evaluation of 
German ALMP. However, their results also imply that after 30 months we 
can already get a reasonable idea about the magnitude of possible long-
term effects, at least for the shorter programmes.6  
3.2 Definition of our evaluation sample and programme 
participation 
Our population of interest is defined by those unemployed who receive 
unemployment benefits (UB) or unemployment assistance (UA) and who 
are eligible for programme participation. According to German legislation, 
this is also the main target group of German ALMP. Our sample consists of 
the inflow into unemployment from insured employment or out of labour 
force between January 2000 and the first half of December 2002. If there 
are multiple entries into unemployment of a person in this period, we con-
sider the first one as the sample inflow date.  
                                                          
6  The studies of Gerfin and Lechner (2002); Frölich, Lechner, and Steiger (2003); 
Lechner and Smith (2005) and Sianesi (2004) faced similar problems. 
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When choosing the appropriate subpopulation from our inflow sample into 
unemployment, we aim at having a homogenous group of people that 
covers the prime age part of the East German7 population who is eligible 
for participation in the programmes under consideration. Therefore, we 
require that all individuals were employed8 at least once before pro-
gramme participation and that they received unemployment benefits (UB) 
or assistance (UA) in the month before the programme start (as well as in 
the month of potential programme start for nonparticipants).9 To avoid 
most influences coming from retirement, early retirement, and primary 
education, we also impose an age restriction (25-49 years). Concentrating 
on the main body of the active labour force, we exclude unemployed who 
were trainees, home workers, apprentices, or without previous employ-
ment. Furthermore, we exclude unemployed with an intensity of the last 
employment before programme participation below half of the usual full-
time working hours. 
Note that drawing this subpopulation requires the use of variables meas-
ured relatively to the start date of the programme, which is only available 
for participants. Moreover, several variables potentially influencing both 
selection into programmes and outcomes should be measured relatively to 
the start of the programme. In this paper, we follow one of the ap-
proaches suggested by Lechner (1999, 2002b) to simulate start dates for 
nonparticipants. We regress the log start date of participants on a set of 
time invariant personal and regional characteristics and use the estimated 
coefficients plus a draw in the residual distribution to predict start dates 
for nonparticipants. 
We define participants as those unemployed who participate at least once 
in a programme in the three years from the inflow into our sample. Ac-
cordingly, nonparticipants are all persons who do not enter a programme 
                                                          
7  We exclude Berlin. 
8  'Employed' means that we observe the person at least once in insured employment in 
the data. 
9  In fact, receipt of UB or UA directly before entering a programme is not sufficient to 
ensure eligibility. Individuals must also have a formal professional degree or at least 
three years of work experience. Thus by also requiring individuals to be employed at 
least once before the programme, the remaining group of participants and nonpartici-
pants is most likely to be eligible. 
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in this period. However, since we observe outcomes only up to mid 2005, 
we only evaluate the first participation of a person in a programme that 
occurs after the date of the inflow into the sample and before 2003.  
3.3 Selected descriptive statistics 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables. The numbers 
indicate that entry into the programmes is highly selective (for a full list of 
variables and statistics, see the internet appendix).  
Table 5: Means and shares (in %) of selected variables 
Treatment NP SCM JSA ST JRT GT-9M GT-9M+ DC JCS SAM 
Observations 4024 429 1066 549 313 605 533 176 587 463 
 Personal characteristics 
Age (years) 38 38 37 37 37 38 38 34 40 38 
Woman 38 45 40 44 36 29 43 40 34 28 
No professional degree 11 10 10 7 8 7 6 14 10 9 
Completed apprenticeship 85 81 88 86 89 88 81 82 87 89 
University / polytechnic college 
degree 4 8 2 7 3 4 13 5 2 2 
Health problems 14 11 11 9 10 9 9 11 19 7 
 Characteristics of desired job 
Unskilled 30 28 27 22 26 21 18 38 31 24 
Skilled 66 64 71 71 72 74 67 59 66 73 
High-skilled 4 8 3 7 2 5 15 4 2 2 
No work experience required 8 6 8 7 6 5 5 11 7 4 
 Earnings of last job 
Monthly earnings (EUR) 1386 1400 1364 1447 1698 1445 1594 1382 1323 1343 
 
Remaining unemployment benefit claim at the beginning of the current  
unemployment spell 
No claim 50 57 45 50 38 27 26 40 65 34 
Claim (days) 101 70 106 88 140 157 162 105 59 116 
 Employment history over the 10 years before programme start 
Duration of current unemploy-
ment spell (months) 5 7 7 7 7 6 7 8 10 7 
Fraction employed 66 66 65 69 66 70 70 64 58 68 
Fraction unemployed 18 18 17 15 18 15 13 15 25 16 
Fraction out of labour force 11 10 11 10 10 9 10 15 9 9 
 Regional information 
Local unemployment rate ≤ 15% 8 9 8 9 6 10 8 10 4 6 
Local unemployment rate > 25% 11 7 10 8 13 12 8 11 14 13 
Note: If not stated otherwise, entries are in percent. All variables except the duration of the current 
unemployment spell are measured at or relative to the unemployment spell in which (simu-
lated) programme start takes place. The duration of the current unemployment spell is meas-
ured at (simulated) programme start. 
Women seem to be concentrated in SCM, ST, and GT-9M+ while GT-9M, 
JCS, and SAM exhibit a male bias. DC seems to be a device to provide 
younger and untrained unemployed with a first professional degree. JCS 
attracts a larger share of slightly older unemployed, unemployed with 
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health problems, low earnings, and long unemployment durations. It often 
takes place in the regions with the highest unemployment rates. The latter 
is also true for SAM and JRT. Participants in the latter seem to have, how-
ever, above average previous earnings. Nonparticipants differ from par-
ticipants because of their lower current unemployment duration and their 
rather high fractions of untrained unemployed and unemployed with 
health problems. 
Figure 1: Rates of unsubsidised employment before and after programme start 
(unmatched sample) 
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Note: Unsubsidised employment. Month zero is the (simulated) programme start. Negative values 
on the abscissa refer to months before programme start, positive values to the months after 
programme start. 
In Figure 1, we show how nonparticipants and programme participants 
differ in terms of (unsubsidised) employment rates before and after pro-
gramme start, and before correcting for any selectivity. By construction of 
our sample, the employment rates are zero at and in the period directly 
before programme start. Nonparticipants have substantially higher em-
ployment rates in the 10 months before their simulated programme start 
than all the different groups of participants. Participants in JCS exhibit 
particularly low employment rates before programme start while all other 
participants face rather similar rates though the rates of participants in DC 
and SAM seem to fall somewhat more rapidly six months before pro-
gramme start. After the (simulated) programme start, none of the groups 
reaches its pre-programme levels. However, the employment rate of non-
participants recovers quickly. For participants in the shortest programmes 
(SCM, JSA, and ST) there is also a steep ascent in the beginning but it be-
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comes rather flat very early after programme start. For participants in 
both types of GT the ascent of the employment rate is somewhat delayed 
due to their longer durations but the development looks rather positive 
after completion of the programmes. The rates of participants in DC, JCS, 
and SAM recover only very slowly. 
To get a better understanding of how selection into different programmes 
works with respect to employment prospects, we predict the employment 
chances the different groups of participants would have had without a 
programme conditional on a rich set of covariates. This prediction is based 
on a probit estimation of the employment chances of nonparticipants at 
the end of the observation window. For this purpose, we consider only 
employment that generates at least 90% of the earnings of the previous 
job. As explanatory variables, we use all variables that are important in 
the selection models for the different programme participations versus 
nonparticipation. This includes personal characteristics, variables that 
summarise individual pre-programme employment histories and regional 
characteristics.  
In Table 6, we present various statistics for the predicted employment 
probabilities from this estimation. It shows that by various measures JCS 
received by far the most difficult cases in terms of reemployment chances 
(as already suggested by Figure 1), as opposed to the similar programme 
SAM whose participants appear to be very similar to the average, or even 
a bit better. The differences for the remaining groups are not that striking 
and there is a considerable heterogeneity within all programmes. Finally, 
the last column shows that the predicted nonparticipation employment 
chances are, as expected, negatively correlated with the predicted partici-
pation probabilities. However, given the official policies, these correlations 
are surprisingly small. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the predicted probability to be employed in a 
job with at least 90% of previous earnings in half-month 60 after pro-
gramme start 
Participation / Subsample Acronym Mean Median
33%-
Quantile
67%-
Quantile 
Correlation with participation 
probability** 
Nonparticipation NP .27 .19 .10 .34  
Short combined measures SCM .27 .16 .07 .33 -.10* 
Jobseeker assessment JSA .26 .20 .10 .31 -.04* 
Short training ST .27 .19 .10 .31 -.02* 
Job related training JRT .29 .21 .12 .35 -.02 
General training ≤ 9 months GT-9M .32 .27 .15 .41 -.09* 
General training > 9 months GT-9M+ .30 .26 .14 .38 -.09* 
Degree course DC .25 .18 .10 .27 -.02* 
Job creation scheme JCS .17 .09 .03 .15 -.22* 
Structural adjustment measure SAM .29 .24 .16 .34 -.05* 
Total  .27 .19 .10 .33  
Note: Predicted probabilities from a probit estimation among nonparticipants. Dependent variable: 
Employed in unsubsidised employment with at least 90% of the earnings of the last job before 
programme start, measured in half-month 60 after programme start. * Correlation is significant 
on the 5% level. ** Predicted probability to participate in the respective programme or not to 
participate at all. Correlation computed in the population. 
3.4 Measurement of the labour market outcomes 
According to German legislation, the main objective of German ALMP is to 
reduce unemployment by improving the chances of the unemployed to 
find regular (unsubsidised) employment. However, since in East Germany 
there are particularly bad labour market conditions, other objectives like 
preventing or reducing human capital depreciation, keeping the unem-
ployed attached to the labour market or providing social contacts and or-
ganised daily routines by "keeping them busy" in subsidised employment 
or training programmes without the direct prospect of finding a regular job 
have become non-negligible weight. Since in a situation with more than 
20% of people not employed, providing a decent income for those people 
and avoiding social unrests may be other implicit goals of that policy. 
We try to capture the different aspects of the potential effectiveness of the 
different programmes by considering a variety of outcome variables. The 
outcome unsubsidised employment measures the programmes' success in 
helping their participants to find regular employment. We also assess the 
quality of employment in terms of stability of the earnings compared to 
previous jobs as well as potential gains in productivity measured by actual 
earnings differences. In contrast, registered unemployment, which here 
includes programme participation, measures whether individual unem-
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ployment is indeed reduced. The outcome programme participation as-
sesses whether the programme participation we evaluate changes the 
probability of future programme participation in the same or a different 
programme.  
We measure whether participants are better off in terms of total earnings, 
i.e. the sum of earnings from subsidised and unsubsidised employment 
and any benefits from the PES. In contrast, to assess some of the pro-
gramme costs, received benefits measures the benefits and subsidies paid 
by the PES to the unemployed. This outcome variable includes all benefits 
(UB, UA, MA) received during participation in training courses and 60% of 
the wages from subsidised employment. The latter is a conservative proxy 
for subsidies paid by the PES, since that share is not directly observable in 
the data. In many cases, the subsidised fraction of the wage is certainly 
much higher.  
We also assess whether the programmes succeed in keeping their partici-
pants busy through any form of employment or participation in any kind 
of programme. Finally, to enable the comparison with previous findings 
from earlier studies, we consider the outcome total employment that in-
cludes both subsidised and unsubsidised employment. In Section 5, we 
present the main findings from the different outcome variables and the 
different comparisons of the programmes. Table C.1 in Appendix C con-
tains effects accumulated over the 2.5 years in which we observe the 
various outcome variables. Further results are available in the internet ap-
pendix. 
All effects are measured half-monthly based on time relative to the start 
of the programme (with simulated start dates for nonparticipants): Half-
month 1 is the half-month after the programme started. Focusing on the 
beginning instead of the end takes into account the potential endogeneity 
of actual programme duration.  
4 Identification and estimation 
4.1 Conditional independence 
We are interested in the average effects of the programme on the pro-
gramme participants compared to participation in another specific pro-
gramme or no participation at all. To identify these parameters we rely on 
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the conditional independence assumption to solve the selection problem 
that arises from the fact that persons in the different treatments differ 
systematically in a way that might be related to the outcome variables of 
interest (see Section 3.3). The assumption states that if we can observe 
all factors that jointly influence outcomes in the comparison state and the 
participation decision, then - conditional on these factors - participation 
and the outcomes, which the participants would have obtained in the 
comparison state, are independent, and the effects of interest are identi-
fied (Rubin, 1974; Imbens, 2000; Lechner, 2001, 2002a, b). 
Selection into programmes is determined by three main factors: eligibility, 
selection by caseworkers and self-selection by potential participants. Eligi-
bility is ensured by the choice of our evaluation sample (see Section 3.2). 
Given eligibility, based on an assessment of the employment prospects 
and the specific deficits or needs of the unemployed the caseworker de-
cides - usually in consultation with the potential participant – about pro-
gramme participation. According to German legislation, caseworkers have 
to take into account the chances of the unemployed for completing a spe-
cific programme successfully, and the situation in the local labour market. 
The latter is particularly important in East Germany. Therefore, we 
merged rich regional information to our data that allows us to control for 
local labour market conditions in a detailed way. This data contains infor-
mation on the industrial, employment, population, and wealth composition 
of the region as well as migration streams, tax revenues and local unem-
ployment rates. Individual variables in our data capturing information 
about employment prospects and chances for successful completion of a 
programme include age, educational attainment, family and health status, 
characteristics of the desired job as well as employment histories for at 
least 10 years before the programme. The latter include information on 
employment status, employers, earnings, position in previous job, specific 
occupation, and industry.  
From the point of view of the unemployed, his decision whether or not to 
participate in a programme is guided by considerations very similar to 
those of the caseworker, but there are also additional reasons for joining 
or not joining a programme. If, for example, the unemployed sees no 
chance to find a job with or without a programme, he may prefer not to 
join a programme that reduces his leisure time. This again requires con-
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trolling for all factors that determine individual employment prospects and 
labour market conditions. Moreover, legislation provides rather strong in-
centives to participate. On the one hand, unemployed who refuse to join a 
programme, risk suspension of their unemployment benefits. On the other 
hand, most programmes count towards acquisition of new unemployment 
benefit claims (see Table 2). Therefore, we include a variable that indi-
cates the UB claim at the beginning of an unemployment spell. 
The internet appendix, Table IA.1, contains a complete list of all variables 
that are available in the data. In contrast to administrative data previously 
available for Germany, we observe whether a jobseeker has health prob-
lems or a disability affecting employability. We also observe a set of char-
acteristics of the job the unemployed is looking for, the number of place-
ment propositions by the PES, as well as information on benefit sanctions 
and compliance to benefit conditions (e.g. attendance at interview with 
PES or cooperation with PES staff). Thus, though we are still not able to 
observe soft characteristics directly like motivation and ability of the un-
employed, we have a set of previously unavailable important proxy vari-
ables and we are able to capture their indirect effects on pre-programme 
employment history that is starting effectively observed shortly after unifi-
cation in 1990. 
4.2 Estimation 
All possible parametric, semi- and nonparametric estimators of treatments 
effects with observational data are built on the principle that for every 
comparison of two programmes, for participants in the programme of in-
terest, we need comparison observations from the other programme with 
the same distribution of relevant characteristics. Characteristics are rele-
vant if they jointly influence selection and outcomes (see Section 4.1 for 
these variables). Here, we use adjusted propensity score matching esti-
mators for multiple treatments as our baseline estimator to produce such 
comparisons. A clear advantage of these estimators is that they are es-
sentially nonparametric and that they allow arbitrary individual effect het-
erogeneity (see Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999, for matching with a 
binary treatment, and Imbens, 2000, and Lechner, 2001, for multiple 
treatments). 
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To obtain estimates of the conditional choice probabilities (the so-called 
propensity scores), which we use in our selection correction mechanism to 
form our comparison groups, we estimate probit models for all compari-
sons (all programme types against each other as well as nonparticipation). 
The analysis revealed that gender, age, qualification, and family status are 
important individual characteristics that determine participation. Further-
more, observed employment and unemployment histories are significantly 
correlated with participation choice. Moreover, the characteristics of the 
desired job an unemployed is looking for differ systematically among pro-
grammes. Regional information, such as the industrial, employment, and 
wealth composition of the region as well as tax revenues, which entered 
the probits in a highly disaggregated way to capture the specifics of sup-
ply and demand in the local labour market, play important roles in the se-
lection process. Finally, remaining unemployment benefit claims indeed 
seem to provide rather strong incentives to enter a programme. 
We use a matching procedure that incorporates the improvements sug-
gested by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005a). These improvements 
aim at two issues: (i) To allow for higher precision when many 'good' 
comparison observations are available, they incorporate the idea of calli-
per or radius matching (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) into the standard 
algorithm used for example by Gerfin and Lechner (2002). (ii) Further-
more, matching quality is increased by exploiting the fact that appropriate 
weighted regressions that use the sampling weights from matching have 
the so-called double robustness property. This property implies that the 
estimator remains consistent if either the matching step is based on a cor-
rectly specified selection model, or the regression model is correctly speci-
fied (e.g. Rubin, 1979; Joffe, Ten Have, Feldman, and Kimmel, 2004). 
Moreover, this procedure should reduce small sample bias as well as as-
ymptotic bias of matching estimators (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006) and 
thus increase robustness of the estimator. The actual matching protocol is 
shown in Table B.1. See Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005a) for more 
information on this estimator. 
5 The effects of programme participation 
Below we present various figures displaying the average programme ef-
fects of the programme participants of the different programmes com-
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pared to nonparticipation for various outcome variables. Each line in the 
respective figure represents a different programme and relates to the ef-
fects for the specific population of participants in that programme. Dots 
appear on a particular line if the effect is pointwise significant on the 5%-
level. Outcomes are either measured in percentage points when they re-
late to changes in labour market status, or in differences of EUR when 
they relate to some earnings or income variable. The results are given for 
every half-month after the programme start, but the labeling on the cor-
responding axes refers to the respective month after the start of the pro-
gramme. In the figures presented below, we only focus on the compari-
sons with nonparticipation. Extensive inter-programme comparisons, how-
ever, are available in the internet appendix of this paper, as well as in one 
of the following tables.. 
5.1 Programmes increase unemployment of their partici-
pants 
Figure 2 shows the first of our key findings, namely that programme par-
ticipation generally increases individual unemployment compared to non-
participation. From the figure, we see that this effect differs substantially 
between the programmes, but there is not a single programme leading to 
a reduction in unemployment.  
Figure 2: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: 
registered unemployment 
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Note: Abscissa: Months after programme start. Ordinate: Effect in %-points. Each line represents 
the respective population of participants, which may differ for each programme. Dots indicate 
that the effect is significant on the 5% level (sig.). 
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Generally, the negative effects are worst in the beginning and decline 
somewhat over time. They are also worse for the longer programmes: 
Over the 30 months considered, participants in DC accumulate 14 (!) 
months of additional unemployment, with SAM 11 months, with JCS 8 
months and with GT-9+ they accumulate 7 months (see Table C.1 in Ap-
pendix C for detailed results). The increase in the unemployment duration 
may well be due to the fact that all programmes increase the period in 
which benefits can be received by the unemployed. 
5.2 Programmes keep participants busy and increase 
benefit receipt  
Figure 3 shows that the programmes do not only increase the unemploy-
ment duration, but they also increase the likelihood of attending another 
programme in the future. This seems particularly true for the three types 
of the short training measures. In total over the 2.5 years after pro-
gramme starts, these programmes accumulate each about 5-6 months of 
additional programme participation, whereas the other programmes add 
about 2-3 months of additional programme participation. 
Figure 3: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: 
further programme participation  
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Note: See note below Figure 2. For programme participants we only consider further participations 
after the actual programme evaluated. 
Table 7 shows in what kind of programmes unemployed participate. Non-
participants also exhibit some programme participation after the 3-year 
window for which we require them not to participate, mainly in the cate-
IABDiscussionPaper No. 20/2006   
 
 
28
gory other programmes, the largest fraction of which are temporary wage 
subsidies for regular jobs and support of self-employment. This category 
is also frequented by most of the participants who exhibit future participa-
tions.10 Participation in the short training measures is often followed by GT 
and for JSA also by DC. Participants in GT, on the other hand, often par-
ticipate in a JCS after the completion of GT. 
Table 7: Further programme participation (%) 
Treatment status Acronym SCM JSA ST JRT GT DC JCS SAM Other 
At least 
one 
Nonparticipation NP 1 3 2 0.1 0.8 0.2 3 0.4 7 0.16 
Short combined measures SCM 10 8 5 2 18 6 7 2 16 0.62 
Jobseeker assessment JSA 2 14 4 2 10 11 7 3 17 0.59 
Short training ST 3 8 9 2 11 5 8 5 20 0.59 
Job related training JRT 5 12 6 4 5 2 9 4 13 0.51 
General training GT 3 9 7 1 6 1 8 3 20 0.51 
Degree course DC 4 10 6 1 6 3 3 1 13 0.41 
Job creation scheme JCS 4 7 3 1 4 2 13 2 20 0.49 
Structural adjustment 
measure SAM 4 6 4 1 3 2 7 4 13 0.38 
Note: The largest fraction of Other are temporary wage subsidies followed by support of self-
employment. 
Our next finding in Figure 4 shows the effect of programme participation 
on any form of employment, including the time in any programme. It 
shows that one of the effects of programmes in East Germany is keeping 
the unemployed busy. For all programmes, Figure 4 shows that for this 
definition of employment large drops occur around the time when most 
participants complete their programme. 
                                                          
10  In many cases, regular programmes were followed by periods of employment accom-
panied by a 6 or 12 month wage subsidy. To avoid having to pay back that subsidy, 
firms have to keep the initially subsidised employers for at least another period of un-
subsidised employment of the same length as the subsidised employment period. 
Therefore, for some comparisons we see large drops in programme participation (for 
the definition of the outcome variables and the state of nonparticipation, all wage sub-
sidy programmes are coded as programme participation, even if they are not explicitly 
evaluated in this paper) about 6 months after the end of a 6-month wage subsidy. 
See the internet appendix for all details. 
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Figure 4: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: 
subsidised and unsubsidised employment and programme participa-
tion 
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Note: See note below Figure 2. 
Figure 5 shows that the programmes do not only keep their participants 
busy, but the programmes (directly and indirectly) reward their partici-
pants by increasing the amount of unemployment benefits paid to them 
(incl. all benefits and 60% of wages received while participating in subsi-
dised employment). Summing up these payments over the 2.5 year hori-
zon, it appears that participants in DC and SAM get an extra amount of 
about 8000 EUR of benefits, participants in GT-9M+ about 7000 EUR, in 
JCS about 5000 EUR, in JRT and GT-9M about 4000 EUR, in JSA about 
3500 EUR and in SCM and ST about 2500 EUR. These numbers are sub-
stantial and hint at the large cost of the programmes in terms of benefits 
and wage subsidies. 
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Figure 5: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: 
benefits (EUR) 
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Note: See note below Figure 2. 
5.3 Programmes do not increase the employment 
chances of their participants 
It should clearly be one of the primary goals of East German training and 
employment programmes to improve the chances of the participants to 
find an unsubsidised job. Figure 6 shows that, however, after 2.5 years 
such effects are absent. 
The only programmes that have no, or almost no, negative effect at the 
end of the observation period are the short combined measures (SCM) 
and short general training (GT-9M) programmes. All other programmes 
have significant negative effects. However, 2.5 years might be too short 
an observation period for a programme that has a typical duration of 2 
years, like DC, and a corresponding large (huge!) lock-in effect. This pro-
gramme may or may not show future positive effects. Even for this pro-
gramme, it is worrying that the negative effect after 2.5 years is quite 
large with about -15%. Certainly, for the short training programmes and 
probably also the employment programmes, the negative effects after 2.5 
years are an indication that negative long-run effects should be expected. 
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Figure 6: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: 
unsubsidised employment 
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Note: See note below Figure 2. 
5.4 Several groups of participants would have been bet-
ter off had they participated in a different programme 
We already saw that some groups of programme participants would have 
had better labour market chances had they not participated in any pro-
grammes. In this section, we show that even ignoring the option of non-
participation, some programme groups would have fared better had they 
participated in a different programme.  
Table 8 presents this comparison for all programmes and their participants 
(given in lines) compared to all alternatives (given in the columns) based 
on the outcome variable measuring unsubsidised employment. Whereas 
the upper part of the table contains the point-in-time estimate for the end 
of the observation period, the lower panel presents the number of months 
accumulated over those 2.5 years. Whenever an effect is negative, it 
means that on average the programme group would have fared better in 
the alternative programme. The shaded fields on the main diagonal of this 
table show the level of the outcome variable for the actual participants in 
the respective programme. 
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Table 8: Effects of programme participation for participants in one programme 
had they participated in another programme: unsubsidised employ-
ment  
Programmes Comparison state 
 SCM JSA ST JRT GT-9M GT-9M+ DC JCS SAM NP 
SCM 0.36 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.13 0.14 -0.01 
JSA -0.09 0.31 -0.04 0.02 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.06* 
ST -0.07 0.03 0.33 -0.11 -0.06 0.06 0.14 0.10 0.13 -0.06 
JRT -0.14 -0.02 -0.07 0.32 -0.10 -0.04 -0.01 0.10 0.08 -0.09 
GT-9M -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.42 0.07 0.22* 0.12 0.10 -0.01 
GT-9M+ -0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.08 0.37 0.19 0.10 0.10 -0.10 
DC -0.11 -0.06 -0.16* -0.05 -0.15* -0.09 0.20 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 
JCS -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.12* -0.13 0.01 0.17 -0.01 -0.06 
SAM -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.28 -0.11 
 Cumulated months over 2.5 years 
SCM 9.2 2.1* 1.1 2.6 0.8 3.8* 5.9* 4.8* 6.3* -2.2* 
JSA -2.4 8.2 -2.0 1.1 -0.5 2.3* 5.2* 2.2 4.3* -4.3* 
ST -0.4 1.3 9.4 -0.5 0.9 4.0* 7.8* 4.1* 6.0* -3.1* 
JRT -5.2 -1.8 -4.0* 7.5 -1.9 1.8 5.2* 1.7 4.4* -5.8* 
GT-9M -4.0 0.7 -1.9 1.4 9.4 3.2* 7.2* 2.7 4.8* -4.6* 
GT-9M+ -7.0* -1.8 -4.3* -0.9 -3.4* 6.5 5.1* 1.6 2.9* -8.5* 
DC -9.3* -5.0* -9.3* -4.8* -6.3* -3.8* 1.8 -2.3* -1.9* -10.4* 
JCS -2.9 -2.5* -2.6 -2.0 -2.3* -2.0 1.8 3.1 0.2 -5.0* 
SAM -7.3* -3.3* -5.6* -3.2* -3.1* -1.8* 1.9* -0.8 4.3 -8.6* 
Note: Numbers in italics indicate significance on the 10% level, bold numbers on the 5% level, and * 
on the 1% level. Dark shaded entries on the diagonal are the levels of the respective potential 
outcome in the respective group of participants. Off-diagonal elements are the effects of the 
programme given in the line for its participants compared the state that those participants 
would have participated in the programme given as headings of a column. 
Ignoring the state of nonparticipation and taking only the case where both 
outcome measures agree, we see (at least) that participants in JSA, GT-
9M+, DC, JCS, and SAM would have improved their employment chances 
had they participated in the shorter programmes in GT-9M (or SCM). This 
indicates that there is room for improving the process of allocating the 
unemployed to the various programmes. 
5.5 Unemployed with reasonable chances on the labour 
market got hurt most 
Next, we analyse the effects of the programmes on unsubsidised employ-
ment for the groups with good and bad no-programme labour market 
chances separately. This separation is performed according to the no-
programme employment index discussed in Section 3.3.  
The results for the group with better chances are presented in Figure 7. 
They are striking in the sense that all programmes with the exception of 
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GT-9M (and perhaps SCM) hurt this group. SAM, JCS, and DC have large 
negative effects of about -30%, whereas the shorter programmes have 
negative effects between -10% and -20%.  
Figure 7: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: 
unsubsidised employment; unemployed with non-programme em-
ployment chances above the median  
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Note: See note below Figure 2. The employment index is equal to the predicted probabilities from a 
probit in the pool of nonparticipants. Dependent variable: employed in unsubsidised employ-
ment with at least 90% of the earnings of the last job before programme start, measured in 
half-month 60 after programme start. 
For the group which has worse labour market chances even without the 
programmes (Table 8), at least none of the programmes seem to reduce 
employment after 30 months significantly, however, a significant positive 
effect cannot be detected either. 
A straightforward reason for this finding may be due to differential lock-in 
effects. The better the pre-programme employment chances, the quicker 
an unemployed finds a job. Therefore, the reduction in employment rates 
due to a lack of job search and reduced job offers while participation in a 
programme is larger for 'better' unemployed, leading to a larger lock-in 
effect as compared to 'worse' unemployed who would need longer anyway 
to find a job. Apparently, the lock-in effects got so large that 'good' pro-
gramme participants could recover. 
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Figure 8: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: 
unsubsidised employment; unemployed with non-programme em-
ployment chances below the 33% quantile 
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Note: See note below Figure 2. The employment index is equal to the predicted probabilities from a 
probit in the pool of nonparticipants. Dependent variable: employed in unsubsidised employ-
ment with at least 90% of the earnings of the last job before programme start, measured in 
half-month 60 after programme start. 
5.6 Why were the previous results more positive?  
In a previous study by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005b) that was 
based on a similar methodology, we found generally more positive effects 
of the training programmes that were in effect 10 years earlier. For the 
three training programmes that we looked at (there was no information on 
employment programmes and subsidies in the old data), we found posi-
tive effects for retraining (similar to DC) after about 35 months. This is 
beyond our horizon available in this paper, but for the shorter training 
programmes we obtained significant positive effects compared to nonpar-
ticipation after 25 months for training courses longer than 6 months, and 
after about 12 months for training courses 6 months and shorter. What 
has changed? One thing that is different between the two studies is that 
for the first six years the old data did not allow to distinguish subsidised 
and non-subsidised employment.  
Figure 9 presents the results of our current analysis based on an employ-
ment variable similar to the one used previously. We see that the negative 
effects of programmes disappear, with the exception of DC, which still 
shows negative effects of about -15%. However, no positive effects occur 
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either, leading us to the conclusion that the definition of the outcome 
variable is not the reason for the discrepancies in the findings of the two 
papers. 
Figure 9: Effects of programme participation compared to nonparticipation: 
total (subsidised and unsubsidised) employment  
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Note: See note below Figure 2. 
Since there is no data available on programmes between 1997 and 2000, 
it is very hard to analyse the reasons for the changes. It could be that the 
programme quality, or the quality of the selection process into the pro-
grammes, or the quality of the suitable potential participants declined, or 
that the labour market changed in a direction that made it harder to re-
ward programme participation. This issue remains open for future re-
search. 
6 Sensitivity checks 
We conducted several sensitivity analyses, the details of which are given 
in the internet appendix. 
We did not find any substantial heterogeneity of the programme effects 
for the socio-economic groups we looked at, other than the general fea-
ture mentioned above, namely that unemployed with intact pre-
programme labour market chances fair worse than unemployed with bad 
pre-programme labour market chances. 
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With respect to the technical properties of the estimation, we varied the 
criteria to define the common support as well as the time window used to 
define participation as well as nonparticipation, but no significant differ-
ences appeared. 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyse the most important components of the East 
German active labour market policy between 2000 and 2002. Our empiri-
cal investigation is based on a well-suited, large, and informative individ-
ual database of participants and nonparticipants that originated from ad-
ministrative records. These data are analysed with econometric matching 
methods. We considered various labour market outcomes over a period of 
30 months after the respective programmes started. Our analysis leads us 
to the following policy conclusions: 
If the success of the programmes is measured by the primary goal of the 
official active labour market policy (ALMP), namely, ALMP should bring its 
participants back into jobs in the first labour market, all programmes 
failed. They do not improve the employment chances or earnings. In par-
ticular, for the group of individuals with better employment chances in the 
labour market, several programmes reduce those chances by a consider-
able amount. This finding is however not surprising. By using training and 
employment programmes, active labour market policies can at best re-
duce unemployment due to mismatch in the labour market. Furthermore, 
it may prevent a deterioration of the general human capital of the work-
force due to individual interruptions of the employment spells and the lack 
of learning on the job while in unemployment. ALMP can certainly not 
solve the deep structural problems in the labour market experienced in 
East Germany over the last decade. In other words, it tries to alleviate 
some of symptoms of the sickness of the East German labour market, but 
cannot cure the disease. 
If ALMP has to fail to deliver better individual labour market outcomes 
given the specific circumstances of the East German economy, could it still 
be worthwhile running ALMP programmes? Indeed, one may argue that 
ALMP is still required in East Germany at least for two reasons: The first 
reason is that participation in those programmes keeps people busy and 
provides them with some income from work or work-related tasks. In 
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other words, it may be and is used to combat social unrest in an environ-
ment that saw (official) unemployment rates around 20% for a long time, 
and non-employment rates that are considerably higher. The second rea-
son for having ALMP could be to keep people ready for work, i.e. use short 
training and employment programmes to keep their working skills and 
human capital from deteriorating, so that they actually will find jobs when 
(if) the structural problems of the East German economy will be overcome 
and the economy will ultimately pick up. Our analysis shows that the pro-
grammes are effective in the first dimension. The effectiveness in the sec-
ond dimension however remains to be seen. 
Taking those arguments seriously, an active labour market policy for East 
Germany should give up the goal to increase the individual probability of 
unemployed to find regular employment, which cannot be achieved any-
way. Instead, it should concentrate on the two smaller goals explained 
above, which are worth to reach as well. However, such a policy would 
look differently than the one we analysed. In particular, it would drasti-
cally reduce the expensive long-term courses that make only sense if the 
unemployed were educated with skills that are in considerable short sup-
ply, which does not appear to be the case on a large scale in East Ger-
many. Unemployed should participate in employment programmes and 
take up jobs related to hiring subsidies, even if those jobs will only be of a 
temporary nature. Furthermore, sending unemployed from time to time to 
shorter training programmes to practice and update their skills should also 
be considered as worthwhile. However, there remains the overarching is-
sue about the costs to reach the limited goals of such a policy. Although 
costs would be probably somewhat smaller than for today's policy, it is not 
clear at all how much the taxpayer will be willing to pay for such a reor-
ganised active labour market policy in East German. 
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Appendix A: Data 
A.1 Features of the data sources merged in the combined data-
base 
Table A.1: Data sources used 
Source  Period  Available information  Important variables  
Social  
insurance  
records  
Jan. 1990-
Dec. 2004  
Times of insured employment;  
personal characteristics  
Form of employment, industry, 
earnings, position in job; profes-
sion, education, age, gender, 
nationality, regional information  
Benefit  
payment  
register  
Jan. 1990-
Jun. 2005  
Times of receipt of unemployment 
benefits, unemployment assistance 
or maintenance allowance; personal 
characteristics  
Type and amount of benefit, re-
maining benefit claim, benefit 
sanctions; marital status, number 
of children  
Programme  
participation 
data  
Jan. 2000-
Jun. 2005 
Participation in ALMP measures;  
programme information; personal 
characteristics  
Type of programme, planned and 
actual duration, (un)successful 
completion, capacity; profession, 
education, health problems, re-
gional information  
Jobseeker 
register  
Jan. 2000-
Jun. 2005  
Job search relevant information; 
personal characteristics  
Desired form of employment, 
reason for determination of last 
employment, number of job of-
fers, compliance to benefit condi-
tions, date of last interview, health 
problems and judgement whether 
these affect employability  
 
A.2 Further details on the data 
Several groups of people are not included in the data either because they 
have not been subject to social insurance contributions like civil servants 
and the self-employed, or because they receive benefits that are not ad-
ministered by the PES like recipients of social assistance. However, focus-
ing on unemployed individuals who receive unemployment benefits or un-
employment assistance - which is the main target group of German ALMP 
and for whom is full record of these people in the data - alleviates this 
problem to a large extend. 
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Appendix B: Technical details of the matching estimator 
used 
Table B.1: A matching protocol for the estimation of a counterfactual outcome 
and the effects 
Step 1 Specify a reference distribution defined by X.  
Step 2 Pool the observations forming the reference distribution and the participants in the respec-
tive period. Code an indicator variable W, which is 1 if the observation belongs to the refer-
ence distribution. All indices, 0 or 1, used below relate to the actual or potential values of W. 
Step 3 Specify and estimate a binary probit for ( ) : ( 1| )p x P W X x= = =  
Step 4 Restrict sample to common support: Delete all observations with probabilities larger than the 
smallest maximum and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by W.  
Step 4 Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables. 
 
Standard propensity score matching step (multiple treatments) 
a-1) Choose one observation in the subsample defined by W=1 and delete it from that pool. 
b-1) Find an observation in the subsample defined by W=0 that is as close as possible to the 
one chosen in step a-1) in terms of ( ),p x x% . 'Closeness' is based on the Mahalano-
bis distance. Do not remove that observation, so that it can be used again.  
c-1) Repeat a-1) and b-1) until no observation with W=0 is left. 
 
Exploit thick support of X to increase efficiency (radius matching step) 
d-1) Compute the maximum distance (d) obtained for any comparison between member of 
reference distribution and matched comparison observations. 
a-2) Repeat a-1). 
b-2) Repeat b-1). If possible, find other observations in the subsample of W=0 that are at 
least as close as R * d to the one chosen in step a-2) (to gain efficiency). Do not re-
move these observations, so that they can be used again. Compute weights for all 
chosen comparisons observations that are proportional to their distance. Normalise 
the weights such that they add to one. 
c-2) Repeat a-2) and b-2) until no participant in W=1 is left. 
d-2) For any potential comparison observation, add the weights obtained in a-2) and b-2). 
 
Exploit double robustness properties to adjust small mismatches by regression 
e) Using the weights ( )iw x  obtained in d-2), run a weighted linear regression of the outcome 
variable on the variables used to define the distance (and an intercept).  
f-1) Predict the potential outcome 0 ( )iy x  of every observation using the coefficients of this 
regression: 0ˆ ( )iy x .  
f-2) Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for  0( | 1)E Y W =  as: 
00
11
1 1
1
ˆˆ 1( 0) ( )1( 1) ( )N i
i
W w y xW y x
N N=
== −∑ . 
g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in d-2), compute a weighted mean of 
the outcome variables in W=0. Subtract the bias from this estimate to get 
0( | 1)E Y W = . 
Step 5 Repeat Steps 2 to 4 with the nonparticipants playing the role of participants before. This 
gives the desired estimate of the counterfactual nonparticipation outcome. 
Step 6 The difference of the potential outcomes gives is the desired estimate of the effect with  
respect to the reference distribution specified in Step 1. 
Note: We use the fixed-weight heteroscedasticity robust standard errors suggested by Lechner, Miquel, and 
Wunsch (2005a). Since participants and nonparticipants are independent, variance of the effect is the 
sum of the variances of the potential outcomes. x%  includes gender, elapsed unemployment duration un-
til programme start, and programme start date. x%  is included to ensure a high match quality with respect 
to these critical variables. R is fixed to 90% in this application (different values are checked in the sensi-
tivity analysis). 
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Appendix C: Additional results 
Table C.1: Cumulated outcomes 2.5 years after programme start 
Employment (months) Earnings (EUR) Treatment Comparison 
Unsub-
sidised 
Unsubsidised 
with stable 
earnings 
Total (incl. 
subsidised) 
Unemploy-
ment 
(months) 
Programme 
participation 
(months) 
Not unem-
ployed 
(months) 
From unsub-
sidised em-
ployment  
Received 
benefits  
Total earn-
ings (incl. 
benefits) 
SCM NP -2.2* -2.0* 0.3 4.2* 5.4* 5.1* -3388* 2703* 584 
(N = 417) JSA 2.1* 1.7* 2.1 -2.4 0.1 -0.3 3269* -677 2628 
 ST 1.1 1.0 0.6 -0.7 0.2 1.3 1593 14 1359 
 JRT 2.6 1.4 3.2 -2.1 2.6* 0.5 3798 -126 4011 
 GT ≤ 9 Months 0.8 -0.3 0.1 -1.5 1.7 -1.4 1439 -1464 -192 
 GT > 9 Months 3.8* 2.7* 5.6* -3.7 4.1* -0.9 6237* -1616 5501* 
 DC 5.9* 3.2* 8.3* -7.2 4.7* -7.7 7848* -4327 4719 
 JCS 4.8* 3.2* -3.8 -4.9 3.8* 0.0 7440* -2692 959 
 SAM 6.3* 3.6* -5.6 -6.8 4.4* -1.6 9302* -5067* -1043 
JSA NP -4.3* -3.1* -1.5* 6.5* 5.6* 5.5* -5654* 3509* -911 
(N = 1081) SCM -2.4 -2.0 -2.0 2.9 0.9 0.6 -3630 1420 -2089 
 ST -2.0 -0.5 -2.3 2.7 1.2 1.5 -2311 1679* -839 
 JRT 1.1 0.3 2.0 -0.6 2.6* 2.0 528 -43 839 
 GT ≤ 9 Months -0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.2 2.9* 0.8 -1410 -359 -1424 
 GT > 9 Months 2.3* 1.6* 3.5* -2.1 3.6* -0.6 3732* -1670 2577 
 DC 5.2* 2.5* 7.3* -5.9 4.1* -5.6 6715* -4259 3536 
 JCS 2.2 0.7 -5.8* -2.0 3.7* 0.2 2940 -1582 -1992 
 SAM 4.3* 2.0* -9.1* -4.7 4.6* -2.7 6058* -4507* -4405 
ST NP -3.1* -2.7* 0.1 4.6* 5.4* 4.2* -4370* 2555* -262 
(N = 551) SCM -0.4 -0.9 0.7 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -734 -296 -476 
 JSA 1.3 1.2 1.5 -2.1 -0.6 -1.9 2496 -1475 1063 
 JRT -0.5 0.4 1.1 -0.1 2.3 -2.0 -360 762 1156 
 GT ≤ 9 Months 0.9 0.3 2.1 -2.1 2.8* -0.5 599 -956 234 
 GT > 9 Months 4.0* 2.7* 6.3* -4.4 4.0* -0.1 5773* -2365 4489 
 DC 7.8* 4.3* 10.7* -9.7 4.6* -6.4 10841* -7093* 5197 
 JCS 4.1* 1.8 -5.3 -4.0 3.5* -2.4 6486* -2487 25 
 SAM 6.0* 3.5* -6.3 -7.8* 4.5* -2.7 9083* -5025* -1309 
To be continued. 
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Table C.1: Cumulated outcomes 2.5 years after programme start - continued 
Employment (months) Earnings (EUR) Treatment Comparison 
Unsub-
sidised 
Unsubsidised 
with stable 
earnings 
Total (incl. 
subsidised) 
Unemploy-
ment 
(months) 
Programme 
participation 
(months) 
Not unem-
ployed 
(months) 
Unsubsidised 
employment  
Received 
benefits  
Total earn-
ings (incl. 
benefits) 
JRT NP -5.8* -3.7* -3.7* 7.3* 2.6* 3.2* -7909* 3776* -3181 
(N = 323) SCM -5.2 -3.4 -5.0 4.5 -0.3 -1.0 -5600 1968 -3659 
 JSA -1.8 0.1 -2.9* 1.1 -2.5* -2.5 -998 486 -928 
 ST -4.0* -1.3 -5.6* 4.2 -1.6 -1.5 -3684 2007 -2619 
 GT ≤ 9 Months -1.9 -1.2 -1.5 1.3 0.6 -0.6 -2051 476 -1471 
 GT > 9 Months 1.8 2.1* 2.7 -2.8 0.9 -1.7 3786 -1810 2337 
 DC 5.2* 3.3* 7.0* -6.5 0.8 -6.3 7934* -5491 3291 
 JCS 1.7 2.1 -6.8* -2.3 -0.7 -1.7 2721 -1896 -2830 
 SAM 4.4* 2.6* -10.0* -4.5 1.4* -4.0 7261* -4218* -3028 
GT ≤ 9 Months NP -4.6* -3.5* -2.8* 6.9* 2.7* 3.9* -6514* 4134* -1478 
(N = 619) SCM -4.0 -1.9 -3.8 4.2 -0.9 -1.2 -6295 1912 -4504 
 JSA 0.7 0.9 -0.4 -0.5 -3.3* -1.9 1977 -57 1462 
 ST -1.9 -0.1 -3.5* 2.6 -2.0* -0.4 -1561 1671 -739 
 JRT 1.4 0.5 1.1 -0.4 -0.9 0.8 1653 700 2347 
 GT > 9 Months 3.2* 2.7* 3.3* -3.4* 0.3 -1.5 5697* -2081* 3709 
 DC 7.2* 5.0* 8.9* -8.2 0.6 -5.9 10968* -6444* 5324 
 JCS 2.7 1.7 -7.1* -3.0 -0.2 -1.7 4982 -1546 -828 
 SAM 4.8* 2.8* -10.1* -4.9 1.4* -4.3 7925* -4498* -3684 
GT > 9 Months NP -8.5* -5.6* -6.9* 11.0* 2.3* 4.8* -13772* 6848* -6133* 
(N = 538) SCM -7.0* -2.6 -7.8* 7.4* -1.5 -0.4 -11670* 4215* -8167 
 JSA -1.8 -1.7 -3.2* 2.3 -3.9* -0.3 -2932 1264 -2424 
 ST -4.3* -2.3* -5.5* 5.5* -2.1* 1.9 -6503* 3233* -4018 
 JRT -0.9 -1.3 -1.1 1.2 -0.6 3.0 -4632 1710 -2953 
 GT ≤ 9 Months -3.4* -2.0* -3.5* 3.3 -0.8 1.0 -6090* 1642 -4531 
 DC 5.1* 2.7* 6.5* -5.8 1.2 -3.6 7338* -5461 2580 
 JCS 1.6 0.6 -10.8* -1.8 -0.7 -0.1 3009 -699 -2969 
 SAM 2.9* 1.0 -14.2* -3.3 0.7 -3.5 4356* -3727 -7369 
To be continued. 
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Table C.1: Cumulated outcomes 2.5 years after programme start - continued  
Employment (months) Earnings (EUR) Treatment Comparison 
Unsub-
sidised 
Unsubsidised 
with stable 
earnings 
Total (incl. 
subsidised) 
Unemploy-
ment 
(months) 
Programme 
participation 
(months) 
Not unem-
ployed 
(months) 
From unsub-
sidised em-
ployment  
Received 
benefits  
Total ear-
nings (incl. 
benefits) 
DC NP -10.4* -6.3* -10.0* 14.1* 1.1* 12.1* -14706* 8213* -6291* 
(N = 170) SCM -9.3* -5.5* -10.9* 10.7* -3.8* 6.7* -13091* 6304* -7690 
 JSA -5.0* -3.6* -7.2* 5.5* -5.3* 6.1* -6617* 3984* -3662* 
 ST -9.3* -4.5* -11.4* 11.2* -2.9* 7.0* -12251* 7107* -6231 
 JRT -4.8* -3.6* -7.1* 5.8 -2.9* 8.0* -7470* 3970* -4553 
 GT ≤ 9 Months -6.3* -4.2* -7.8* 7.0* -1.8* 7.8* -9059* 4749* -5009* 
 GT > 9 Months -3.8* -2.0* -4.3* 4.2 -0.6 6.0* -5547* 3087* -2697 
 JCS -2.3 -0.9 -13.3* 3.7 -2.0 7.2* -2966 2079 -5969 
 SAM -1.9* -1.7 -18.5* 2.4 0.0 3.1 -2628 -380 -10921* 
JCS NP -5.0* -3.2* 5.9* 7.7* 2.2* 6.8* -6634* 5261* 3284* 
(N = 577) SCM -2.9 -1.6 5.6* 2.6 -2.3 2.6 -3701 3012 2673 
 JSA -2.5* -1.9* 4.8* 2.5 -3.7* -0.3 -3484* 1900 1444 
 ST -2.6 -1.7 5.8* 3.4 -1.7 3.3 -3522 3077 2903 
 JRT -2.0 -1.4 6.7* 2.2 -0.7 0.2 -3271 2328 2534 
 GT ≤ 9 Months -2.3* -1.7* 6.9* 2.0 0.3 1.3 -3345* 1546 2068 
 GT > 9 Months -2.0 -0.9 8.4* 2.6 1.2* -1.3 -1880 1762 4166 
 DC 1.8 1.0 12.3* -2.5 1.5 -7.3 2365 -1102 5698 
 SAM 0.2 -0.2 -2.0 0.0 1.0 -1.8 417 -450 -1167 
SAM NP -8.6* -5.2* 7.2* 11.0* 1.6* 8.1* -11501* 7909* 3585 
(N = 430) SCM -7.3* -3.9 6.0 8.0* -2.5 2.9 -9711* 5585* 1626 
 JSA -3.3* -1.7* 9.0* 3.7* -4.0* 1.9 -4846* 2773* 3553 
 ST -5.6* -3.6* 5.2 6.4* -2.0 3.8 -7744* 5169* 2385 
 JRT -3.2* -2.5 10.7* 3.7 -1.4 4.4 -5583* 4058* 4654 
 GT ≤ 9 Months -3.1* -1.9* 10.6* 3.1 -1.5* 4.4* -4921* 3555* 4967* 
 GT > 9 Months -1.8 -1.2 12.2* 1.8 -0.6 1.8 -2820 1554 5112 
 DC 1.9* 0.7 17.4* -2.6 0.2 -2.9 2370* 536 9954* 
 JCS -0.8 -0.5 2.9 0.9 -1.5* 2.4 -1523 1828 2277 
Note: Numbers in italics indicate significance on the 10% level, bold numbers on the 5% level, and * on the 1% level. 
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